Summary of Issue: Reasonable Circumstance As Prescribed

Decision 32022A Full Text of Decision 32022A

Claimant left a permanent teaching job in order to seek a temporary replacement position. Board allowed claimant's appeal under par.28(4)(n) of UI Act. Held by Umpire that Board clearly erred in law in deciding that the actions taken by the claimant were justified under that provision.

Decision A-0037.96 Full Text of Decision A-0037.96

Claimant quit job to attend University. Because the claimant had left his employment only after a great deal of planning and that his plans to attend school -- through no fault of his own -- fell through, Umpire stated that the situation in which the claimant found himself was akin to leaving employment with the reasonable assurance of other employment in the immediate future and dismissed the Commission's appeal.**Referring to its decision in Furey (A-819-95), the FCA reiterated that the circumstances which existed at the time the claimant left his job are those which are relevant.

Decision A-0599.95 Full Text of Decision A-0599.95

It cannot be said that this case falls within the language "such other reasonable circumstances as prescribed" because none have been prescribed by regulations adopted by the Commission.

Decision 32044 Full Text of Decision 32044

Reliance by the BOR on s.28(4)n) is an error in law. That provision does not confer a discretion upon the Commission to prescribe reasonable circumstances. I interpret that provision to mean such other reasonable circumstances as may be prescribed by Reg. as empowered by the U.I. Act.

Decision A-0691.94 Full Text of Decision A-0691.94

The event that led to the disqualification occurred on 14-8-92 when she left her employment. Yet, para. 28(4)(n) only came into effect on 3-4-93. In addition, the phrase "no reasonable circumstance" alluded to in para. 28(4)(n) had not yet been prescribed by regulation.

Decision 26046 Full Text of Decision 26046

Refer to: A-0691.94

Decision 27065 Full Text of Decision 27065

In reviewing the evidence, the claimant clearly does not fall within any of the specific subsections of 28(4) of the Act. The question then is whether or not all of the surrounding circumstances are sufficient as to give her the benefit of subsection (n).

Decision 25120 Full Text of Decision 25120

NOTE: The FCA, in rendering its decision in Greg Stevens (A-599-95, CUB 28834), has said that to rely on the expression "such other reasonable circumstances as prescribed" was not possible because none had been prescribed by regulations adopted by the Commission. In the context of a statute, the word "prescribed" is usually associated with either the statute itself or with the regulations. The subsection does not read "such other reasonable circumstances as are in the discretion of the Commission". There is no discretion to be exercised by the Commission.