| Issue: |
Sub-Issue 1: |
Sub-Issue 2: |
Sub-Issue 3: |
| penalties |
proof |
|
|
Summary:
Merely disbelieving the claimant's testimony is not a sufficient basis for the Board's conclusion that he knowingly made false or misleading statements. There is another element of proof required, relating to his state of mind, one on which the onus rests with the Commission.
It was argued that it should be the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or some intermediate between that and the ordinary civil standard. I am of the view that the appropriate standard is the ordinary civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.
Ss. 33(1) does not create an offence. The use of the word "knowingly" is insufficient by itself to impute an offence requiring the full criminal standard of proof. It rather has the effect of saving innocent misrepresentations from penalties.
| Issue: |
Sub-Issue 1: |
Sub-Issue 2: |
Sub-Issue 3: |
| board of referees |
jurisdiction |
reason for existence of boards |
|
Summary:
Although a Board of Referees is not composed of ad hoc representatives of labour, management and the public but is rather drawn from a nominated panel, it is nevertheless evident that it is far from a truly "professional" tribunal.
| Issue: |
Sub-Issue 1: |
Sub-Issue 2: |
Sub-Issue 3: |
| board of referees |
statement of facts |
not to be read strictly |
|
Summary:
Disbelief of evidence that is inherently improbable because of its special characteristics may be said to speak for itself and not to require explanation, particularly by a non-specialist tribunal. Claimant's search for work while he was otherwise occupied in a venture found improbable.
